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PROBLEMATIZING EUROPE’S BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE RECENT REFUGEE CRISIS 
LIAM ANFIELD SIMMONDS, UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK 
MENTOR: MARIJN NIEUWENHUIS 
Abstract 
The fundamental problem of Europe’s borders is how a bounded social reality 
is to be organized, primarily meaning who is to be included and who is to be 
excluded. The present refugee crisis has only served to expose and intensify 
this raison d'être of borders as exclusionary mechanisms which carry great 
political, economic, and symbolic weight, frequently much to the detriment of 
those excluded by them. Primarily drawing from the international political 
sociological work of Didier Bigo and affiliated scholars, I present a theoretical 
paper coupled with relevant empirical examples to present a critique of the 
exclusionary modes of operation of Europe’s borders and the techniques that 
enable them. Exploring the constitution of Europe’s borders as technological-
ly-enabled to decouple from the conventional spatial groundings of borders, I 
analyze the relationality between the logics, objectives and functions of Eu-
rope’s borders in relation to the dominant discursive framing of refugees and 
migrants in the context of the recent migrant crisis in Europe. I hold that this 
tragic event has not suddenly created new problems for Europe’s borders, 
immigration, and asylum systems, but simply exposed the multiple failures of 
the control and management practices inbuilt in the EU’s border regime. 
Introduction  
The problems of Europe’s borders are relative to the lived experience that 
heavily determines one’s relation to them. The desired configuration, opera-
tion, and objectives of the border are dependent on the spatial and cultural 
position of the actor who engages with them. Borders, while now again prolif-
erating in their significance, have always been an important organizer of in-
terstate and intrastate social reality (Delanty, 2006: 183). The fundamental 
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problem that concerns borders, and not just those of Europe,  is that various 1
individuals and groups hold a diverse spectrum of views on how a given 
bounded societal reality is to be organized, primarily regarding who is to be 
included and who is to be excluded (Newman, 2003: 14). The present refugee 
crisis has only served to expose and intensify this raison d'être of borders as 
exclusionary mechanisms which carry great political, economic, and symbolic 
weight, frequently to the detriment of those excluded by them. In this article 
I present a critique of the exclusionary modes of operation of Europe’s borders 
and the techniques that enable them.    
 My analysis draws on a range of literature including critical migration 
and security studies (De Genova, 2002; Delanty, 2006; Newman, 2003; O'-
Dowd, 2002; Rumford, 2006, 2007; Walters, 2002), surveillance studies 
(Ajana, 2012; Fuchs, 2013; Gandy, 2012; Jenkins, 2012) and, most prominent-
ly, the international political sociological research of Didier Bigo and affiliat-
ed scholars (Bigo, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2008; Bigo & Guild, 2005a; 2005b; Cey-
han, 2005; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Tsoukala, 2005). 
 I assert that the arrangement of Europe’s collective societal reality is 
based upon the contested, multi-sited construction of fear, anxiety, and prej-
udice. This social and geographical anxiety, heavily orchestrated by an over-
arching “governmentality of unease,” feeds into the guiding security frame-
work of the bordering practices of the European Union (EU) and its member 
states (Bigo & Guild, 2005a: 4). A series of noxious discourses propagated by 
“managers of unease,” media outlets, and the general public all underpin the 
logic of the EU’s border regime that construct the migrant as a source of risk 
along socio-economic, securitarian, and identity axes. It is these discourses 
that contribute to the formation of the legitimizing framework for the exclu-
sionary practices of the EU. The tragic events of the current refugee crisis 
have not suddenly created new problems for Europe’s borders, immigration, 
and asylum systems, but simply exposed the multiple failures of the control 
and management practices inbuilt in the EU’s border regime.  
 The structure of this paper includes three main sections, the first of 
which introduces the complexity of Europe’s border in a digital age, examin-
ing the ‘ferromagnetic’ property of Europe’s border regime. In the second sec-
tion I examine the range of discourses that contribute to the securitization of 
the migrant along the basis of three principles; socio-economic, securitarian, 
 For simplicity, I roughly conflate Europe with the European Union. Not in a geo1 -
graphic sense, but on the basis that the destination countries for an overwhelming 
percentage of the refugees are EU member states. (BBC News, 2016, see chart two).
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and identity. In the third section I demonstrate the problematic functioning 
of Europe’s border regime, roughly demarcated across technical and social-
cultural lines. The paper concludes with a summary of key findings. 
Understanding the Borders of Europe  
In an age of “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000), the borders of Europe are no 
longer simple physical demarcations of territory. Instead, they liquefy and 
stretch inside and beyond the conventional perimeter of a state’s territory. 
Borders function across multiple axes (cultural, political, and economic) and 
fluctuate in thickness and visibility in accordance to the positionality of the 
those engaging with them (Paasi 2009). The borders of Europe are somewhat 
paradoxical entities, for some they are becoming ever more permeable and 
invisible, facilitating the neoliberal desire for fluidity in the circulation of 
capital, services, and people, but for others they have proliferated in number 
and location, acting as thicker, harder limits on movement, citizenship 
claims, and access to other internally-bounded societal realties (Delanty, 
2006: 189-90). The globalizing “demise of territoriality” is accompanied with 
redoubled efforts by the state and its intelligence, security, and military ap-
paratuses to strengthen the border while retaining the flexibility beget by 
globalizing forces (Walters, 2002: 561-2). Such is the extent of the diffusion of 
borders, decoupled from traditional understandings of spatiality, that they 
now come to subsume and function across entire countries (Rumford, 2006: 
156). Benefit agencies, for instance, now serve additionally as immigration-
status checkpoints, supplementing a regime of border control that extends 
beyond and below the traditional border (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002: 35).  
 The key structural factor in managing the flows of movement is the 
technologies of surveillance which permit identification (biometrics, data col-
lection), sorting, and, eventually, exclusion on the basis of perceived desir-
ability (Bigo, 2005: 49). These databases of identifying information gathered 
through various surveillance appaetatuses are increasingly networked to-
gether, allowing data to flow liberally and invisibly between governmental 
agencies, bodies, and even private companies to further the precision and ef-
ficient filtration of individuals deemed as too “risky” for inclusion (Bigo, 2005: 
88). The increasingly porous border of the EU has entailed a greater empha-
sis placed on wide assemblages of surveillance systems and biometric tech-
nologies to ensure the future security of society and the state by acting in the 
present (Bigo, 2005: 70, 89). Through the ban-opticon, technologies of sur-
veillance at the spatially diffuse border are rendered productive through the 
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execution of a pre-emptive logic of exclusion which rests upon “upon the con-
struction of profiles that frame who is “abnormal,” and upon… [the] normal-
ization of social groups whose behaviors are monitored for their present and 
their future” (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 2). Defining the identity of individuals, 
sorting them into desirable and undesirable subjects, and subsequently erect-
ing impediments on movement and restrictions on entry, either prior to the 
travel of the migrant or after crossing, characterizes Europe’s omnipresent 
‘ferromagnetic shape-memory’ border. The constitution of the border, its ef-
fects, location, and interaction with individuals completely differ dependent 
on these categories. It is the management of people, the constitutive compo-
nents to social reality, that have become the guiding objective of borders, not 
territory (Bigo, 2001: 111).  
 The uncoupling of the exclusionary functions of the border to a fixed 
spatiality is best understood through the operation of the Schengen area. The 
freedom of some is maintained through the exclusion of others (Bigo & Guild, 
2005a: 3). The functioning of the Schengen area requires the presence of sur-
veillance, classification and exclusionary mechanisms to identify and (pre-
emptively) remove those who are perceived as threats to the EU, be it socially 
or economically, for the benefit of non-risky peoples who are essentially unen-
cumbered by the very same borders. As such, given the variability of Europe’s 
borders, the popular claim of a “Fortress Europe” appear misleading. Instead, 
Europe’s borders are “ferromagnetic.” Through the operation of the net-
worked surveillant assemblage, the scope and tightness of which is relation-
ality dependent on the “magnetic” triggers of undesirability that are tripped 
and who tripped them (Rumford, 2007: 331). These modular, dynamic borders 
are diffused throughout society, interconnected between various administra-
tive, intelligence, and private entities, and manage human mobility with a 
nuance not possible with the static, hard borders of old (Rumford, 2007: 331). 
In addition to being spatially transient, the borders of Europe are also tempo-
rally fluid, periodically dissolving and resolidifying in response to a given so-
cioeconomic or political context (Rumford, 2007: 331; Guild, et al., 2015: 5). 
The refugee crisis is one such pertinent example of the resolidification of Eu-
rope’s borders. This hardening does not occur in isolation to other events, of 
course, but is significantly shaped by the popular rhetoric and discourses of 
political and securitarian expertise, discursive frames that speak through the 
language of fear, threat and securitization. If we indeed understand borders 
as facilitators of an idealized social reality, the strengthening of borders can 
only be understood in relation to a threat to this normative reality. I suggest 
that it is primarily through performative discourse that the identities of mi-
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grants and refugees are constructed as sources of risk and thus are liable to 
be excluded through the ferromagnetic borders of Europe (Bigo, 2002: 63). 
The Construction of the Migrant as Enemy  
Through the dispositif of the ban-opticon surveillance techniques profile and 
categorize migratory flows on the basis of “desirability.” The exchange of 
fears and beliefs between a “transnational field of professionals in the man-
agement of unease” including politicians, the military, police and border 
forces, private security corporations, as well as the (sensationalist) media, 
formulate a climate of fear and risk though which contemporary bordering 
practices are made intelligible and legitimate (Bigo, 2002: 63-4).  
 Tsoukala identifies three primary axes that construct the migrant as an 
enemy:  
1) The socio-economic principle heavily associates immigration as contribut-
ing to unemployment, economic decline, strains on national resources 
such as housing, health care and education, perceived as welfare cheats, 
and as causing urban and social deterioration (2005: 163).  
2) The securitarian principle connects a range of security issues with immi-
gration, from petty delinquency to organized crime (particularly drug traf-
ficking [Derrida, 1995]), and, most pertinently, fundamentalist extremism 
and terrorism (Tsoukala, 2005: 163).  
3) 3) The identity principle links migratory flows with a threatening erosion 
of homogeneous national or supranational identity and other ‘undesirable’ 
changes in the demographics of nations across Europe (2005: 163-4).  
These three interrelated principles underpin a “discourse of fear” which 
heightens the existential anxieties of European “identity, security and well-
being.” (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002:  22, 21)  
 The November 2015 Paris attacks, Charlie Hebdo shooting, and other 
recent incidents have further inflamed sentiments conducive to this discourse 
of fear (Guild, et al., 2015: 13). As Europe’s border become more porous, the 
“traditional certainty of boundaries” is eroded and the identity of the existen-
tial, external threat has merged with the internal (Bigo, 2002: 76). The 
Möbius ribbon of (in)security has entailed, under the logic of risk avoidance, 
the stereotyping of those who can be considered a source of unease. As such, 
both internal and external (in)securities are increasingly attributed to the 
“enemy within,” the ontological actuality of which is projected onto the crim-
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inogenic migrant who traverses the Möbius ribbon (Bigo, 2001: 112). Of 
course, given the heterogeneity of the societies of the EU’s member states, the 
exact discursive representation applied to migratory flows will differ in each 
country. Generally speaking, France, for example, constructs the “migrant 
image as that of a religious fanatic,” in Germany the image is of “a revolu-
tionary and deviant,” and in the United Kingdom it depicts migrants as “riot-
ers” with no “decent social behavior.” (Bigo, 2002: 70). I take note here to 
highlight the generalizations of these rhetorics as well as their liability to 
change in accordance with recent global and local developments.    
 These discourses of fear contribute to the securitization of migration 
through the privileging of certain criminogenic factors, most of which are 
based heavily on appearance and nationality (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002: 28). 
The multifaceted threat posed by migratory flows simultaneously demands 
and legitimizes practices of profiling, risk analysis, statistical discrimination, 
categorization, and pre-emptive action (Bigo, 2002: 65-6). It is through these 
functions that the ferromagnetic borders are able to ensnare those defined as 
a source of risk. This is done using information gathered through programs 
such as, among others, Echelon and EUROSUR (Bigo, 2002: 75), as well as 
various private companies and software providers, couching the contentious, 
racial politics of Europe’s bordering practices under a logic of existential ur-
gency and the authority of the statistic (Bigo, 2005: 89, 2008: 12).  
The Borders of Europe and the Refugee Crisis     
THE TECHNICAL DIMENSION 
The mechanisms of border control, regardless of the spatiality or temporality, 
imbue an objective of filtering between the desirable and undesirable (Cey-
han & Tsoukala, 2002: 31). Functioning under the appearance of a neutral 
and objective system, the lived-experience and context of individuals is fre-
quently silenced by the legitimate statistical discrimination of politically-de-
fined “criminogenic” factors of nationality, religion, appearance, wealth, and 
documentation status (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002: 25). The refugee crisis 
highlights the importance of considering the varied, rich individual stories 
and experiences of migratory flows carry prior to systematically and automat-
ically categorizing large groups of people on the basis of quantifiable data 
only. Far from compassion, the function of the border, as seen through the 
dispositif of the ban-opticon, attempts to master an impending and inevitable 
“chaotic future” through a litany of technologies of surveillance and manage-
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ment techniques (Bigo, 2002: 82). The inadequacy of this system, as so 
painfully demonstrated by the refugee crisis, demonstrates another crucial 
foundational problem of the functioning of Europe’s borders: The absolute 
control of borders, especially in an age of increasing porosity, is impossible for 
a neoliberal regime to achieve (Bigo, 2005: 49). The pursuit of the impossible 
only serves to perpetuate the political misery of the destitute (Ceyhan, 2005: 
217). This “will to mastery” (Bigo, 2002: 70) of populations, security, and 
freedom that drives the judgement professionals of security and of politics 
only serves to nourish discourses of fear and myths of national homogeneity. 
The inefficiency and impossibility of this objective, even with advanced sur-
veillance technologies, paradoxically, perpetuates the functioning of this gov-
ernmentality and its related dispositifs, rationalities, and technologies. Simi-
lar to how Foucault argues “devices intended to produce freedom…risk pro-
ducing exactly the opposite” (2008: 69), the European regime of border securi-
ty intends to produce security but only achieves the reproduction of unease. 
With the advent of ferromagnetic borders came the implicit acknowledgement 
that traditional borders were in sufficient in stopping unwanted migratory 
flows (Broeders, 2007: 72).  
 The ubiquitous, diffuse ferromagnetic borderlands and the spatially-
fixed borders of a state’s perimeter function simultaneously and cooperatively 
out of a secret necessity (Rumford, 2006: 156; Bigo, 2005: 50). While the hard, 
visible borders of the EU are nodes of visible security and practical regulatory 
controls, their ability to satisfactorily prevent the movement of “undesirable 
migratory” flows has greatly diminished (Bigo, 2002: 65-7). The porosity of 
Europe’s borders presents a Möbius ribbon of perceiving (in)security. The 
framing of desire for increased international flows, freedom and cooperation 
is counterbalanced by contradictory demands for control, management, and 
exclusion depending on the perception of the observer and the particular flow 
in question (Bigo, 2005: 53; Marin, 2011: 132). These practices of control, 
management, and exclusion are partial contributors to the “crisis” that the 
borders of Europe are currently experiencing due to their “technological-de-
terministic belief that crime and terrorism” can be prevented through the im-
plementation of technology, rather than policy modification or a shift in pub-
lic discourse (Gandy, 2012: 126; Jenkins, 2012: 160; Fuchs, 2013: 1329).  
 The intensification of Europe’s borders through EUROSUR and various 
Frontex operations has not served to seal the borders, rather, as the refugee 
crisis has shown, it has simply led to the increase in criminalization of migra-
tory flows resorting to increasingly dangerous alternative routes of entry 
(Spijkerboer 2007, Human Rights Watch 2015). The internal disagreements 
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between member states on the appropriate distribution of refugees admitted 
or smuggled into Europe demonstrates a typical predicament for the EU as a 
whole. National interests structure the behavior of states to such an extent 
that unanimous solutions are rendered difficult, if not impossible, to imple-
ment (Gross, 2015: 2). The present refugee crisis has exposed the internal 
tensions of Europe’s regime to the world, so great are these strains that Gross 
asserts that “the present system is broke[n].” (2015: 2) The refugee crisis has 
spectacularly demonstrated that even these “new digital borders” cannot ac-
complish this task and that it is perhaps a change in mentalité that must oc-
cur instead of compounding faith in ever-more invasive digitizing, quantify-
ing, and surveilling technologies. 
 Any proclamation of “failure” with regards to Europe’s borders, however, 
ignores the vast political capital that such an event can yield for specific ac-
tors, agencies, and bureaucracies. The functional logic of risk installed in Eu-
rope’s borders through a governmentality of unease that is enacted by a 
transnational field of experts can be seem as exemplified perfectly through 
the fear that the refugee crisis has sparked amongst the people of Europe. 
Migration has become a political technology to reaffirm cultural and political 
beliefs and the role of these managers of unease as providers of security and 
cultivators of political society (Bigo, 2002: 64). The reaction of a number of 
Schengen members to resurrect hard internal borders (Guild, et al. 2015), al-
beit temporarily, visibly reifies the negative formulation of migrants as dan-
gerous and ultimately, unpredictable sources of future risk. This culture of 
fear further serves as an opportunity for security professionals to publicize 
their pro-active commitments towards this risk despite the fact that most 
“illegal” immigrants cross the hard borders of Europe legitimately through 
international airports and become “illegal” by staying beyond their visa valid-
ity period (Frontex, 2016). The functioning of these policies of control and mi-
gration management, regardless of their intended objectives, play a direct 
contribution to the tragedies that have unfolded in Europe and must be re-
vised accordingly (Hess, et al. 2015).  
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION 
As the refugee crisis has poignantly demonstrated, the dynamics of borders 
are key components of social and political reality (Rumford, 2006: 155). The 
“crisis” of Europe’s borders is structured as such through the use of discursive 
frames propagated by the various managers of unease (Holmes & Castañeda, 
2016: 2). Metaphorical devices of water or insectile imagery serve to widen 
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the schisms between the self and the other and reinforce visions of criminali-
ty, depravity, and even the homo sacer (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016: 7). A par-
ticular consequence of the “migrant as enemy” is the amalgamation of all 
non-wealthy, non-business, and non-tourist migratory flows into an incredi-
bly myopic generalization that depicts migrants as defined by Tsoukala’s 
“discourses of fear.” This also serves to further weaken the legal status and 
legitimacy of asylum seekers, blurring the complex dynamics of movement 
and smoothing the hostile discourses which call for their exclusion (Ceyhan & 
Tsoukala, 2002: 23-4). This is coupled with the “socio-political production of 
migrant ‘illegality’”, through which asylum regimes systematically produce 
large amounts of “bogus” asylum seekers on the basis of overly stringent cri-
teria. These definitional practices then eliminate chances of legitimate entry 
which can thus force, as the refugee crisis has demonstrated, would-be asy-
lum seekers to attempt illegal entry (De Genova, 2013: 1180-1). This resul-
tantly furthers the status of the migrant as a core economic/social/securitari-
an threat – “a social distribution of bad” (Bigo, 2002: 71).  
 These demonstrations of illegality are what De Genova calls “Border 
Spectacles,” a performance of extraordinary otherness which perpetuates the 
necessity of excluding migrants (De Genova, 2013: 1180-1). The widespread 
coverage of the refugee crisis is grounded in images of squalid camps, such as 
the “Jungle” in Calais (The Guardian 2016), or protesting behind fences (The 
Washington Post 2016), provide striking pictorial anchorage that explicitly 
promotes the forms of unease espoused by the “identity principle.” These im-
ages serve to evoke fear and othering as much as they do sympathy (Holmes 
& Castañeda, 2016: 6). Following Murray Edelman’s work on the political 
utility of constructing social spectacles (Edelman 1988), such graphic scenes 
of disarray and instability are attributed directly to be the characteristic of 
the migrant, rather than structural factors or influences from Western states. 
These media depictions fuel anxieties of European citizens who fear the 
“transformation” of their societal reality that mass migration will bring into a 
state that mirrors the scenes they view on television or read in the newspaper 
(Huysmans, 2000: 756). Again, this begets the importance of the alteration of 
perceptions that inform these bordering practices if substantive positive 
change is to occur in the handling of the refugee crisis.    
 The cultural function of Europe’s borders offers a means of artificially 
structuring an attempted homogenous European identity through othering, 
usually manifesting in the exclusionary discourses and constructions of racial 
otherness (Bigo, 2005: 60). It is through the lens of the refugee crisis that the 
internal contradictions of this method of formulating a cohesive European 
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identity is revealed. The extreme bordering measures and exclusionary dis-
courses that have resonated from the European Union in attempt to prevent 
the corrosion of European culture, identity and cohesiveness have actually 
contributed to the its own social division and moral degradation. Far from 
unifying against a common threat, these techniques of power—the production 
and exclusion of difference—simultaneously serve an end contradictory to 
their original intention, resulting in rupturing the cohesiveness between 
member states and challenging the liberal ideological premises that the Eu-
ropean Union, in its present form, was originally founded upon. 
Conclusion  
To summarize, in this paper I have demonstrated, in section one, the modern-
ization of the EU’s border regime in an age of liquid modernity, defined as 
moving away from the management and control of territory towards one of 
flows and people. Various technologies have enabled the mobilization of the 
border, a “ferromagnetic” border, functioning in tandem with the harder bor-
ders of the perimeter of a territory. It is through the duality of Europe’s bor-
ders, the shifting, fluid properties they now hold are made actionable through 
the categorization of individual and groups on the basis of opaque, algorith-
mically-determined categories of risk. A significant issue with the ferromag-
netic borders of Europe can be understood through the discursive environ-
ment in which they are constructed. The plethora of threats and risk at-
tributed to immigration has imbued the EU’s border regime with a prejudice 
world view that it executes under the guise of statistical and computational 
rationality, necessity and neutrality. These complex categorizations are sig-
nificantly informed through the production of discursive labels, socio-econom-
ic, securitarian, and identity, which are attached to migrants that produce a 
variety of criminogenic properties that discriminately function in pursuit of 
cultivating a desired bounded social reality. The relationality between these 
stigmatizing discourses and the ferromagnetic operation of Europe’s borders 
are, in many ways, mutually co-constitutive.  
 If indeed, borders are integral to human behavior, the ongoing refugee 
crisis that Europe is experiencing demonstrates an urgent need for a border 
regime constructed upon ideals of compassion and logics of accommodating 
pro-action, rather than fear and exclusion. Normative research conducted on 
the topic of shifting the border regime of the EU would be a daunting task 
but a most desirable one. If positive reform to Europe’s border regime is to be 
achieved, structural and institutional adjustments are not enough. The toxic 
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discourse that defines the migrant as enemy must be dissected, criticized, 
and resisted through the promotion of alternative understandings of the 
world beyond our own borders.   
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